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Abstract Identification and scoring functions are statistical tools to assess the cal-
ibration of risk measure estimates and to compare their performance with other es-
timates, e.g. in backtesting. A risk measure is called identifiable (elicitable) if it ad-
mits a strict identification function (strictly consistent scoring function). We consider
measures of systemic risk introduced in Feinstein et al. (SIAM J. Financial Math.
8:672–708, 2017). Since these are set-valued, we work within the theoretical frame-
work of Fissler et al. (preprint, available online at arXiv:1910.07912v2, 2020) for
forecast evaluation of set-valued functionals. We construct oriented selective identifi-
cation functions, which induce a mixture representation of (strictly) consistent scor-
ing functions. Their applicability is demonstrated with a comprehensive simulation
study.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Systemic risk measures
In the financial mathematics literature, there is a great interest in various types of
risk and in particular its quantitative measurement. The axiomatic approach to the
quantitative assessment of risk was pioneered by Artzner et al. [6] and has since then
been discussed from various angles in many further works; see Föllmer and Schied
[33, Chap. 4] for a comprehensive overview.
The financial crisis of 2007 – 2009 and its aftermaths in the last decade have starkly
underpinned the need to quantitatively assess the risk of an entire financial system
rather than merely its individual entities. One of the first academic works on systemic
risk is the seminal paper by Eisenberg and Noe [20]. The focus of this work, how-
ever, lies on modelling the financial system rather than measuring its systemic risk.
Since then, financial mathematicians have developed a rich strand of literature, en-
compassing different approaches and emphasising various aspects of systemic risk.
The model of [20] has been generalised in different ways, for instance by considering
illiquidity (Rogers and Veraart [57]) or central clearing (Amini et al. [4]). One strand
of literature defines systemic risk measures by applying a scalar risk measure to the
distribution of the total profits and losses of all firms in the system (Acharya et al.
[2], Adrian and Brunnermeier [3]). Recognising the drawbacks of treating the econ-
omy as a portfolio, Chen et al. [13] introduce an axiomatic approach to measuring
systemic risk, further extended by Kromer et al. [48] and Hoffmann et al. [40]. The
axiomatic approach of [13] is widely used and amounts to systemic risk measures of
the form ρ((Y )), where Y is a d-dimensional random vector representing the fi-
nancial system, ρ is a scalar risk measure and  : Rd →R an increasing aggregation
function. However, this approach has the drawback that it results in the measurement
of bailout costs rather than capital requirements that prevent a financial crisis. These
types of risk measures are also called insensitive as they do not take into account the
impact of capital allocations on the system.
As an alternative, so-called sensitive systemic risk measures have been introduced
by Feinstein et al. [23]; see also Biagini et al. [11] and Armenti et al. [5] for related
approaches. Here, one first adds capital to the d financial institutions and then applies
an aggregation function, resulting in systemic risk measures of the form
R(Y ) = {k ∈Rd : ρ((Y + k)) ≤ 0}. (1.1)
Thus one takes into account how the regulation changes the system itself as it aggre-
gates the system Y + k after regulation. In this paper, we mainly focus on this type of
systemic risk measures; see Sect. 2.1 for more details. Above, R(Y ) specifies the set
of all capital allocations k ∈Rd such that the new system Y + k is deemed acceptable
with respect to ρ after being aggregated via . As such, R takes an ex ante perspec-
tive prescribing the injections to (and withdrawals from) each financial firm adequate
to prevent the system Y from a crisis, whereas ρ((Y )), as described above, can be
interpreted as the bailout costs of the system after a systemic event has occurred.
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1.2 Elicitability and identifiability
The field of quantitative risk management has seen a lively debate about which scalar
risk measure is most appropriate in practice; see Embrechts et al. [21], Emmer et al.
[22] for detailed academic discussions and [8] for a regulatory perspective in banking.
Besides differences in axiomatic properties such as coherence [6] and convexity [32]
of risk measures, the debate has also considered more statistical aspects of risk mea-
sures. The two most widely discussed statistical desiderata are robustness in the sense
of Hampel [39] (see also Cont et al. [14] and Krätschmer et al. [47]) and elicitability.
The term elicitability is due to Osband [55, Chap. 2] and Lambert et al. [50]. Using
the terminology of mathematical statistics, a law-invariant risk measure ρ mapping
to R∗ := (−∞,∞] is elicitable on some class M of distributions if it admits an
M-estimator in the sense of Huber and Ronchetti [42, Chap. 3], i.e., if there is a loss









for all F ∈ M and all x ∈ R∗, x = ρ(F ). Any scoring function S satisfying (1.2) is
called strictly M-consistent for ρ : M → R∗. Besides their usage in M-estimation
and regression [46, 45, 53], the fact that strict consistency encourages truthful fore-
casting opens the way to meaningful forecast comparison, see Gneiting [35], which
is closely related to comparative backtests in finance; see Fissler et al. [31] or Nolde
and Ziegel [54]. In a nutshell, let (Yt )t=1,...,N be the profits and losses at the time
points t = 1, . . . ,N and let Xt be a one-step ahead point forecast for Yt , based on
the information Ft−1 available to the forecaster at time point t − 1. That is, Xt is an
Ft−1-measurable random variable. The aim of Xt is to correctly specify the condi-
tional risk measure ρ of Yt given Ft−1, that is, the minimal capital requirement one
needs to add to Yt to make Yt + Xt acceptable under ρ, given the information Ft−1.
The simplest example is when ρ is the negative expectation. Then the ideal forecast
can be written as X∗t = −E[Yt |Ft−1]. For a general law-invariant risk measure ρ, the
ideal forecast for Yt can be expressed as X∗t = ρ(FYt |Ft−1), where FYt |Ft−1 is the con-
ditional distribution of Yt given Ft−1. Note that Xt might be misspecified in the sense
that Xt = X∗t = ρ(FYt |Ft−1), e.g. due to possible estimation errors when coming up
with an estimate of FYt |Ft−1 , due to a misuse of the information Ft−1, or due to calcu-
lation errors when applying the risk measure to the conditional distribution. We refer
to Sect. 5 for some specific examples. If there is another forecaster with his/her own
information sets Gt−1 for time t − 1 who issues alternative Gt−1-measurable point
forecasts Zt , t = 1, . . . ,N , for Yt , then the predictive performance of (Xt )t=1,...,N
is deemed better than the performance of (Zt )t=1,...,N with respect to the scoring
function S if 1
N
∑N
t=1 S(Xt ,Yt ) < 1N
∑N
t=1 S(Zt , Yt ). In the rest of this article, we
conveniently call a point forecast for Yt aiming at correctly specifying ρ(FYt |Ft−1)
for some σ -algebra Ft−1 a forecast for ρ.
Ziegel [63] showed that expectiles are basically the only elicitable and coherent
risk measures. In line with this, the prominent risk measure value at risk at level
α ∈ (0,1) (VaRα), which corresponds to the negative of the lower α-quantile (see
equation (4.1)), turns out to be elicitable, subject to mild conditions, but not coherent.
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On the other hand, expected shortfall at level α ∈ (0,1) (ESα), a tail expectation, is
coherent, but fails to be elicitable; see Gneiting [35] and Weber [62]. Interestingly,
Fissler and Ziegel [27] showed that the pair (VaRα,ESα) is elicitable despite ES’s
failure to have a strictly consistent scoring function on its own; see also Acerbi and
Szekely [1] for a slightly weaker result, and Fissler and Ziegel [30] for a similar result
for range value at risk.
Closely related to the notion of elicitability is the concept of identifiability. While
the former is useful for forecast comparison or model selection, the latter aims at
model and forecast validation or checks for calibration. A law-invariant risk measure
ρ : M → R∗ is identifiable on M if it admits a Z-estimator, i.e., if there is some
function V : R×R →R such that
∫
V (x, y)dF(y) = 0 ⇐⇒ x = ρ(F ) (1.3)
for all F ∈ M and all x ∈ R. Any function V satisfying (1.3) is called a strict
M-identification function for ρ. Here we generalise the definition of identifiability in
the literature to risk-measures possibly assuming the value ∞. Clearly, if ρ(F ) = ∞,
(1.3) means that there is no real number x such that
∫
V (x, y)dF(y) = 0. Steinwart
et al. [58] showed that under appropriate regularity conditions, the identifiability of a
real-valued risk measure is equivalent to its elicitability. Coherently, VaRα is identi-
fiable under mild regularity conditions, using a simple coverage check, whereas ESα
fails to have a strict identification function. For a discussion of identifiability and cal-
ibration in the context of evaluating risk measures, we refer the reader to Davis [15]
and Nolde and Ziegel [54].
1.3 Novel contributions and structure of the paper
The aim of this paper is to establish elicitability and identifiability results for sys-
temic risk measures of the form (1.1) and for derived quantities thereof. This facil-
itates backtests of these risk measures and renders regression frameworks possible.
Since these risk measures are set-valued, we use the terminological distinction be-
tween selective and exhaustive reports introduced in Fissler et al. [25] along with the
corresponding notions of elicitability and identifiability. In a nutshell and translated to
the setting of systemic risk measures of the form (1.1), a selective forecast specifies a
single capital allocation that makes the system acceptable. On the other hand, exhaus-
tive forecasts are more ambitious, aiming at reporting all adequate capital allocations
simultaneously in the form of a set. Consequently, exhaustive scoring or identifica-
tion functions take sets as their first argument, whereas their selective counterparts
work with points as inputs. The corresponding definitions along with basic properties
and assumptions on systemic risk measures defined in (1.1) and derived quantities
such as efficient cash-invariant allocation rules (EARs), see Feinstein et al. [23], are
gathered in Sect. 2.
Section 3 contains our main original contributions, most notably Theorem 3.1 as-
serting the existence of oriented selective identification functions for the functional
R0(Y ) = {k ∈ Rd : ρ((Y + k)) = 0}, and Theorem 3.10, which uses these identi-
fication functions to construct strictly consistent exhaustive scoring functions for R
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from (1.1). Interestingly, these scoring functions arise as an integral construction of
elementary scores, exploiting the orientation of the identification function. This can
be considered a higher-dimensional analogue to the mixture representation of scoring
functions for one-dimensional forecasts established in the seminal paper by Ehm et al.
[19]. Similarly, this gives rise to the diagnostic tool of Murphy diagrams facilitating
the assessment of forecast dominance; see Sect. 3.2.5. Thanks again to the orientation
of the identification functions, we derive order-sensitivity results of these consistent
scoring functions (Proposition 3.13). Concerning EARs as mentioned above, Propo-
sition 3.6 establishes strict selective identification functions for EARs, interestingly
mapping to a function space. On top of these main original contributions, we ex-
ploit the mutual exclusivity result of Fissler et al. [25, Theorem 3.7] to conclude
that systemic risk measures of the form (1.1) are generally not selectively elicitable
(Theorem 3.16).
The elicitability results on R rely on the identifiability of the underlying scalar
risk measure ρ. This spells doom for the elicitability of systemic risk measures in-
duced by ES as a scalar risk measure. Section 4 outlines this issue and establishes a
solution to this challenge at the cost of a higher forecast complexity. Similarly to the
scalar case, considering a pair of R based on ES together with a VaR-related quantity
leads to selective identifiability and exhaustive elicitability results (Proposition 4.1
and Theorem 4.3).
The practical applicability of our results is demonstrated in terms of a simulation
study, which is the content of Sect. 5. Employing Diebold–Mariano tests, we exam-
ine how well the strictly consistent scores are able to distinguish different forecast
performances. We also graphically illustrate the diagnostic tool of Murphy diagrams
in a simulation example, utilising a traffic-light approach suggested in Fissler et al.
[31]. We close the paper with a brief discussion.
In an online preprint version [26], we gather results on positively homogeneous
and translation-invariant scoring functions, additional simulation results as well as
results concerning risk measures insensitive with respect to capital allocations.
2 Notation and terminology
2.1 Measures of systemic risk
Let (,F,P) be an atomless probability space, and for some integer d ≥ 1, let
Yd ⊆ L0(;Rd) be a collection of d-dimensional random vectors which is closed
under translation, meaning that Y ∈ Yd and k ∈ Rd implies that Y + k ∈ Yd . From
a risk management perspective, the random vector Y = (Y1, . . . , Yd) ∈ Yd repre-
sents the respective gains and losses of a system of d financial firms. That is, pos-
itive values of the component Yi represent gains of firm i and negative values cor-
respond to losses. Let Md be the class of probability distributions of elements of
Yd . Let  : Rd → R be a measurable aggregation function, meaning that it is non-
constant and increasing with respect to the componentwise order. An aggregation
function is typically, but not necessarily, assumed to be continuous or even concave.
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Let Y ⊆ L0(;R) be a collection of random variables which is closed under transla-
tion and contains {(Y) : Y ∈ Yd}. Similarly to Md , let M be the class of probability
distributions of elements of Y .
We consider a scalar monetary law-invariant risk measure ρ : Y ∪ R → R∗;
see Artzner et al. [6]. That is, for all X,Z ∈ Y ∪ R and m ∈ R, it holds that
ρ(X + m) = ρ(X) − m (cash-invariance) and ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Z) if X ≥ Z P-a.s. (mono-
tonicity). Moreover, we assume that ρ(0) ∈ R so that cash-invariance induces a
unique mapping ρ : R → R. Exploiting law-invariance, we identify ρ : Y ∪R → R∗
with its induced risk functional ρ̂ : M∪ {δx : x ∈ R} → R∗, where ρ̂(F ) = ρ(X) for
some X ∼ F , and simply write ρ in both cases.
We present the two most natural law-invariant set-valued measures of systemic
risk that are based on ρ and , namely
R : Yd → 2Rd , Y → R(Y ) = {k ∈ Rd : ρ((Y + k)) ≤ 0}, (2.1)
Rins : Yd → 2Rd , Y → Rins(Y ) = {k ∈Rd : ρ((Y) + k̄) ≤ 0}. (2.2)
In (2.2) and later, we use the shorthand k̄ := ∑di=1 ki for k = (k1, . . . , kd) ∈ Rd .
Note the difference between R and Rins. The risk measure R takes an ex ante per-
spective in the sense that it specifies all capital allocations k ∈ Rd needed to be
added to the system Y to make the aggregated system (Y + k) acceptable under
ρ. On the other hand, Rins takes an ex post perspective on quantifying the risk of
the system Y : It first considers the current aggregated system (Y) and then speci-
fies the total capital requirement k̄ one needs to add to make the aggregated system
acceptable, which amounts to specifying the bail-out costs of the aggregated sys-
tem (Y) under ρ. In particular, the risk measure Rins is insensitive to the capital
allocation to each financial firm, disregarding possible transaction costs or other de-
pendence structures between the financial firms and ignoring how the addition of
capital changes the system itself. This justifies the mnemonic terminology. Both risk
measures R and Rins can be of interest in applications, taking into regard the different
perspectives on systemic risk. However, the mathematical treatment and complexity
differ considerably: Due to the cash-invariance of ρ, Rins takes the equivalent form
Rins(Y ) = {k ∈Rd : ρ((Y )) ≤ k̄}. This means that Rins is actually a bijection of the
scalar risk measure ρ ◦  : Yd → R∗ considered in Chen et al. [13]. Therefore, one
has to evaluate the risk measure ρ only once to determine Rins. In contrast, such an
appealing equivalent formulation is generally not available for R unless  is addi-
tive, or is even the sum in which case R and Rins coincide. Consequently, in general,
one is bound to evaluate ρ infinitely often to compute R; see also the discussion in
Feinstein et al. [23]. The main focus of this paper are elicitability and identifiability
results for systemic risk measures of the form (2.1) and (2.2). However, since one can
exploit the one-to-one relation between Rins and ρ ◦  and make use of the revela-
tion principle, see Fissler [24, Sect. 2.3], Gneiting [35] and Osband [55, Sect. 2.1], to
establish (exhaustive) elicitability and identifiability results, we do not present results
about Rins in this paper, but rather defer them to Fissler et al. [26, Supplementary
Material].
For the sake of completeness, we recall the most important properties of R
presented in Feinstein et al. [23]. Because ρ is cash-invariant and  is increas-
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ing, the values of both R and Rins defined in (2.1) and (2.2) are upper sets, i.e.,
R(Y ) = R(Y ) +Rd+ for any Y ∈ Yd , where Rd+ denotes the collection of vec-
tors in Rd with only nonnegative elements and for any two sets A,B ⊆ Rd ,
A + B := {a + b : a ∈ A, b ∈ B} is the usual Minkowski sum. Recall that we have
A + ∅ = ∅ + A = ∅. Following the notation of [23], we denote the collection of up-
per sets in Rd with ordering cone Rd+ by P(Rd;Rd+) := {B ⊆ Rd : B = B + Rd+}.
Both Rd and ∅ are elements of P(Rd;Rd+). Moreover, R defined in (2.1) can at-
tain these values even if the underlying scalar risk measure ρ maps to R only, e.g.
when  is bounded. While R(Y ) = ∅ corresponds to the case that a scalar risk mea-
sure of the financial position Y is +∞, meaning that the system Y is deemed risky
no matter how much capital is injected, the case R(Y ) = Rd corresponds to −∞ in
the scalar case. The latter situation of “cash cows” with the possibility to withdraw
any finite amount of money without rendering the position risky is usually deemed
unrealistic and is excluded. Therefore, we usually only discuss the case R(Y ) = ∅,
but remark that a treatment of the case R(Y ) = Rd would also be possible for most
results. Monotonicity and cash-invariance carry over to R in that R(Y ) ⊇ R(Z) for
all Y,Z ∈ Yd with Y ≥ Z P-a.s. componentwise, and R(Y + k) = R(Y ) − k for all
k ∈ Rd . Monotonicity also carries over to Rins; note, however, that Rins is in gen-
eral not cash-invariant. We introduce further subclasses of P(Rd ;Rd+), where B(Rd)
denotes the Borel-σ -algebra on Rd .
Definition 2.1 The class of Borel-measurable upper subsets of Rd is denoted by
P̂(Rd;Rd+) := (P(Rd ;Rd+) ∩ B(Rd)) \ {Rd}. The class of closed upper subsets of
R
d is denoted by F(Rd;Rd+). Note that F(Rd;Rd+) ⊆ P̂(Rd ;Rd+).
For any set A ⊆ Rd , we denote its topological boundary by ∂A. We introduce the
law-invariant map
R0 : Yd → 2Rd , Y → R0(Y ) =
{
k ∈ Rd : ρ((Y + k)) = 0}. (2.3)
Occasionally and when explicitly stated, we impose one of the following assump-
tions.
Assumption 2.2 For all Y ∈ Yd , R(Y ) ∈ P̂(Rd ;Rd+).
Assumption 2.3 For all Y ∈ Yd , R(Y ) ∈F(Rd ;Rd+) and R0(Y ) = ∂R(Y ).
A sufficient condition for R(Y ) ∈ F(Rd ;Rd+) is that for any convergent sequence
(kn)n∈N ⊆ Rd with limit k, we have
ρ
(






The inequality in (2.4) holds e.g. if  is continuous and if ρ(X) ≤ lim infn→∞ ρ(Xn)
for all sequences (Xn) in Y converging almost surely to X ∈ Y . In particular, if
Y = L∞(;R), ρ is convex,  continuous, and either (a)  is bounded (invoking
the law-invariance of ρ and the results from Jouini et al. [44] and Svindland [60]) or
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(b)  is uniformly continuous, then (2.4) holds. For instance in the network model
considered in Sect. 5.1,  is bounded. Otherwise in the literature,  is often a con-
cave function and thus not bounded (unless it is constant). Hence, for concave , one
could check whether it is uniformly continuous. This is clearly the case for instance
for the most straightforward choice—the sum—as well as for instance for the aggre-
gation function suggested by Amini et al. [4], also considered in Sect. 5.1. Moreover,
note that we provide sufficient conditions only and not necessary ones, so that one
may also check R(Y ) ∈ F(Rd;Rd+) on a case-by-case basis.
If ∅ = R(Y ) ∈ F(Rd;R), then R0(Y ) = ∅. Since  is increasing and ρ is cash-
invariant, one obtains R(Y ) = R0(Y ) + Rd+. Hence the values of R0 determine R
completely. Moreover, if  is strictly increasing, we have R0(Y ) = ∂R(Y ), meaning
that R0(Y ) contains the efficient capital allocations that make Y acceptable under R.
Therefore, under Assumption 2.3, R and R0 are connected via a one-to-one relation.
Again invoking the revelation principle [35, Theorem 4], this means that exhaustive
elicitability results for R (Theorem 3.10 (iii)) carry over to R0. In a nutshell, the
revelation principle asserts that if there is a bijection, say g, such that R0 = g(R),
then R0 is (exhaustively) elicitable if and only if R is elicitable. Moreover, S(A,y)
is strictly consistent for R if and only if S(g−1(A), y) is strictly consistent for R0.
Finally, we recall the definition of an important scalarisation of the systemic risk
measure R, called efficient cash-invariant allocation rule (EAR), as introduced in
Feinstein et al. [23]. Roughly speaking, for Y ∈ Yd , EAR(Y ) specifies the capital
allocations with minimal weighted cost among allocations in R(Y ). For simplicity,
we confine our attention to the situation when R(Y ) is closed and to EARs with a
fixed price or weight vector w ∈Rd++ := {x ∈Rd : x1, . . . , xd > 0}.
Definition 2.4 Suppose that ∅ = R(Y ) ∈ F(Rd ;Rd+) for all Y ∈ Yd . An efficient
cash-invariant allocation rule for a fixed price vector w ∈ Rd++ is given by
EARw(Y ) := arg min
k∈R(Y )
wk . (2.5)
For Y ∈ Yd , if there is a supporting hyperplane of R(Y ) orthogonal to w, then
EARw(Y ) is the intersection of ∂R(Y ) and this hyperplane. Hence EARw(Y ) is not
necessarily a singleton. If there is no supporting hyperplane of R(Y ) orthogonal to w,
the function R(Y )  k → wk is unbounded from below and we set EARw(Y ) = ∅.
Since ρ is law-invariant, so are the derived quantities R, Rins, R0 and EARw .
Therefore, in analogy to our treatment of ρ, we identify R with the risk functional R̂,
where R̂(F ) = R(Y ) for Y ∼ F ∈ Md , and simply write R for either; we use ana-
logous conventions for R0 and EARw .
2.2 Elicitability and identifiability of set-valued functionals
We have already mentioned the definitions of elicitability and identifiability for scalar
risk measures ρ : M → R∗ in (1.2) and (1.3), where we slightly extend the common
definitions to account for ρ possibly attaining ∞. All other risk measures considered
here, R, R0 and EAR, are set-valued, attaining subsets of Rd . Hence we make use of
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the theoretical framework on forecast evaluation of set-valued functionals introduced
in Fissler et al. [25]. The main idea is to have a thorough distinction concerning the
form of the forecasts between a selective notion where forecasts are single points,
and an exhaustive mode where forecasts are set-valued. Moreover, corresponding no-
tions of identifiability and elicitability are introduced and discussed in a very general
setting, with the main result being that—subject to mild conditions—a set-valued
functional is elicitable either in the selective, or the exhaustive sense, or not elic-
itable at all [25, Theorem 2.14]. We confine ourselves to introducing only the no-
tions we discuss in this paper and do so directly in terms of R and R0; the case of
EARs is considered separately later. In the sequel, let A ⊆ 2Rd . Moreover, for scor-
ing functions S : A×Rd →R∗ or identification functions V : Rd × Rd → R, we
use the shorthands S̄(A,F ) := ∫ S(A,y)dF(y) and V̄ (x,F ) := ∫ V (x, y)dF(y) for
A ∈ A, x ∈Rd , and tacitly assume that these integrals exist for all F ∈ Md , where
we say that the integral
∫
g(y)dF(y) of a function g : R → [−∞,∞] exists if g is
measurable and
∫






g(y)− dF(y) ∈ [−∞,∞].
Definition 2.5 A map S : A × Rd → R∗ is an Md -consistent exhaustive scoring




) ≤ S̄(A,F ), ∀A ∈ A,∀F ∈ Md . (2.6)
The map S is a strictly Md -consistent exhaustive scoring function for R if it is
Md -consistent for R and if equality in (2.6) implies that A = R(F). Finally, the risk
measure R : Md → A is exhaustively elicitable if there is a strictly M-consistent
exhaustive scoring function for R.
Note that the strict consistency of an exhaustive scoring function S for R implies
that S̄(R(F ),F ) ∈R for all F ∈Md .
Definition 2.6 A map V : Rd × Rd → R is a selective Md -identification function
for R0 : Md → A if V̄ (x,F ) = 0 for all x ∈ R0(F ) and all F ∈ Md . Moreover,
V is a strict selective Md -identification function for R0 if for all x ∈ Rd and all
F ∈Md , it holds that V̄ (x,F ) = 0 if and only if x ∈ R0(F ). Finally, the risk measure
R0 : Md →A is selectively identifiable if there is a strict selective Md -identification
function for R0.
3 Main results
We present the main results of the paper in this section, with identifiability results
in Sect. 3.1 and elicitability results in Sect. 3.2. Theorem 3.1 establishes the selec-
tive identifiability of R0. Notably, the main assumption behind Theorem 3.1 and the
subsequent results relying on this identifiability is the identifiability of the underly-
ing scalar risk measure ρ in (2.1). A fortiori, ρ needs to admit an oriented identi-
fication function. According to Steinwart et al. [58], a strict identification function
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Vρ : R × R → R for a scalar risk measure ρ : M → R∗ is called oriented if for
all x ∈ R and all F ∈ M, it holds that V̄ρ(x,F ) < 0 if and only if x < ρ(F). In-
voking [58, Theorem 8], the existence of an oriented identification function for ρ is
equivalent to the elicitability of ρ under mild regularity conditions. Proposition 3.9
establishes that under certain assumptions on the aggregation function , also the
converse holds: the selective identifiability of R0 implies the identifiability of ρ.
3.1 Identifiability results
Theorem 3.1 Let ρ : M → R∗ be identifiable. Then the following assertions hold
for R0 : Md → 2Rd defined in (2.3):
(i) R0 is selectively identifiable. If Vρ : R × R → R is a strict M-identification
function for ρ, then
VR0 : Rd ×Rd →R, (k, y) → VR0(k, y) = Vρ
(
0,(y + k)) (3.1)
is a strict selective Md -identification function for R0.
(ii) If Vρ is an oriented strict M-identification function for ρ, then VR0 defined in





< 0, if k /∈ R(F),
= 0, if k ∈ R0(F ),
> 0, if k ∈ R(F) \ R0(F ).
(3.2)
Proof (i) Let Vρ be a strict M-identification function for ρ. This means that for all





x,(Y + k))] = 0 ⇐⇒ x = ρ((Y + k)). (3.3)





0,(Y + k))] = 0 ⇐⇒ 0 = ρ((Y + k)) ⇐⇒ k ∈ R0(Y ),
which holds in particular for R0(Y ) = ∅. Therefore, VR0 is a strict selective M-identi-
fication function for R0.
(ii) Now assume that Vρ is an oriented strict M-identification function for ρ. This









< 0, if x < ρ((Y + k)),
= 0, if x = ρ((Y + k)),
> 0, if x > ρ((Y + k)).
(3.4)
Setting x = 0 in (3.4) yields the claim. 
Interestingly, if VR0 : Rd × Rd → R is an oriented strict selective Md -identi-
fication function for R0 and V̄R0(·,F ), F ∈ Md , is continuous, then R(F) is closed.
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Remark 3.2 If VR0 is oriented in the sense of (3.4), the full risk measure R can also
be selectively ‘identified’ by checking the sign of the expected identification function
V̄R0(k,F ). Even though we are unaware of a result that excludes its exhaustive iden-
tifiability in the sense of Fissler et al. [25] per se, we do not see a way to come up
with a (statistically feasible) exhaustive identification function for R.
Remark 3.3 Equation (3.1) explicitly constructs a strict selective Md -identification
function VR0 : Rd ×Rd → R for R0, given a certain strict M-identification function
Vρ : R × R → R for ρ. Hence, such a VR0 definitely depends on the choice of Vρ .
Fissler [24, Proposition 3.2.1] states that under some richness assumptions on the
class M, any other strict identification function Ṽρ : R×R → R for ρ is of the form
Ṽρ(x, z) = g(x)Vρ(x, z), where g : R → R is non-vanishing. If Vρ is oriented, then
Ṽρ is oriented if and only if g > 0. Consequently, starting with such an identifica-
tion function Ṽρ , the resulting (oriented) strict selective Md -identification function
ṼR0 : Rd ×Rd →R takes the form
ṼR0(k, y) = Ṽρ
(
0,(y + k)) = g(0)Vρ
(
0,(y + k)).
Hence one ends up with a scaled version of VR0 , where the scaling factor g(0) is
positive if both VR0 and ṼR0 are oriented.
In a similar spirit as Remark 3.3, one might also wonder whether the (oriented)
strict selective identification functions constructed in Theorem 3.1 are the only (ori-
ented) strict selective identification functions for R0. This is definitely not the case
since due to the linearity of the expectation, any function V ′R0 : Rd ×Rd →R with
V ′R0(k, y) = h(k)VR0(k, y) = h(k)Vρ
(
0,(y + k)), (3.5)
where h : Rd → R is non-vanishing, is again a strict selective Md -identification
function for R0. Moreover, if VR0 is oriented, then V
′
R0
defined in (3.5) is oriented
if and only if h > 0. In particular, the constant g(0) appearing in Remark 3.3 can be
incorporated into the function h so that we see that it does not matter which (oriented)
strict exhaustive identification function Ṽρ we choose to end up with the form in (3.5).
The next result establishes that basically all selective Md -identification functions for
R0 are of the form (3.5).
Proposition 3.4 Let A ⊆ Rd and let VR0 ,V ′R0 : A × Rd → R be strict selective
Md -identification functions for R0 : Md → 2Rd . If for every x ∈ A, there are
F1,F2 ∈Md such that V̄R0(x,F1) > 0 and V̄R0(x,F2) < 0 and if Md is convex,
then there is a non-vanishing function h : A →R such that
V̄ ′R0(x,F ) = h(x)V̄R0(x,F ) (3.6)
for all x ∈ A and all F ∈Md .
Proof The proof follows along the lines of the proof of Fissler and Ziegel [27, Theo-
rem 3.2]; see Osband [55, Theorem 2.1]. The dimensionality of x does not play any
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role in the proof. As our identification functions map to R, we use k = 1 in the proof
of [27, Theorem 3.2]. The assumption on the existence of F1,F2 ∈Md such that the
signs of V̄R0 are different plus the convexity of Md are equivalent to [27, Assump-
tion (V1)]. If we replace ∇S̄(x,F ) in the proof of [27, Theorem 3.2] by V̄ ′(x,F ), we
obtain that there is a function h : A → R such that V̄ ′(x,F ) = h(x)V̄ (x,F ) for all
x ∈ A and all F ∈ Md . Since the matrix BG in the proof of [27, Theorem 3.2] will
be a 2 × 3 matrix of rank 1 for any x ∈ A, h(x) has to be nonzero for all x ∈ A. 
Remark 3.5 (i) Note that the assumptions of Proposition 3.4 imply that for all x ∈ A,
there is some F ∈ Md such that x ∈ R0(F ). That is why we formulated the result in
terms of a general action domain A ⊆ Rd .
(ii) If Md is rich enough and under additional regularity conditions on VR0 , one
can also establish a pointwise version of (3.6); see [27, 28] for details.
Finally, we turn our attention to EARs as introduced in Definition 2.4. For any
price or weight vector w ∈ Rd , we use the notation w⊥ := {x ∈ Rd : wx = 0} for
the orthogonal complement of the subspace spanned by w. With Rw
⊥
, we denote as
usual the space of all functions from w⊥ to R.
Proposition 3.6 Suppose that Assumption 2.3 holds and that R0 has a selective ori-
ented strict Md -identification function VR0 in the sense of (3.2). Let w ∈ Rd++ and
define the map VEARw : Rd ×Rd → Rw⊥ via
VEARw(k, y) : w⊥ →R, w⊥  x → VEARw(k, y)(x) = VR0(k + x, y)
for (k, y) ∈Rd ×Rd . Then VEARw is a strict selective Md -identification function for
EARw in the sense that for any F ∈Md , k ∈ Rd , we have
k ∈ EARw(F ) ⇐⇒ V̄EARw(k,F ) ≤ 0 and V̄EARw(k,F )(0) = 0. (3.7)
Proof Under Assumption 2.3, (3.7) is equivalent to
k ∈ EARw(F ) ⇐⇒ (k + w⊥) ∩ int
(
R(F)
) = ∅ and k ∈ R0(F ).
For the ‘⇒’ part, assume that k ∈ EARw(F ). Then clearly k ∈ R0(F ). Suppose
k +h ∈ int(R(F )) for some h ∈ w⊥. Then there is ε > 0 such that k +h− ε1 ∈ R(F)
and we get w(k + h − ε1) = wk − εw1 < wk, which is a contradiction.
For the ‘⇐’ part, assume that k ∈ R0(F ) and (k + w) ∩ int(R(F )) = ∅, and
let h ∈ R(F) be such that wh < wk, that is, w(k − h) > 0. Then there are
α ∈ R and 
 ∈ w⊥ with 1 = α(k − h) + 
. By multiplying with w from the left,
one gets that α = w1




 = h + 1
α
1 ∈ R(F) +Rd++ ⊆ intR(F), which contradicts the assumption that
(k + w) ∩ int(R(F )) = ∅. Therefore wk ≤ wh for all h ∈ R(F), which means
that k ∈ EARw(F ). 
If the underlying risk measure R is known to assume convex sets only (e.g. if ρ
is convex and  concave, see Feinstein et al. [23]), it is even sufficient to evaluate
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Fig. 1 An illustration of Proposition 3.6 for dimension d = 2. In both panels, R(Y ) (depicted in grey) is
convex. Straight lines correspond to affine translations of w⊥ . For k in the red area, V̄R0 (k + x,F ) ≤ 0,
and if k is in the blue area, V̄R0 (k + x,F ) > 0. In the left panel, EARw(Y ) exists and is a singleton
consisting of the point a. In the right panel, the function k → wk, k ∈ R(Y ), is unbounded from below
so that EARw(Y ) = ∅
V̄EARw(k,F )(x), or its empirical counterpart, for x ∈ w⊥ in a neighbourhood of 0,
which can also be seen nicely in Fig. 1.
In Fissler et al. [25, Sect. 3.1], different versions of the convex level sets (CxLS)
property are introduced and their necessity for identifiability and elicitability for set-
valued functionals is discussed. Our next result establishes the so-called selective
CxLS* property of EARw . That is, for all F0, F1 ∈ Md and all λ ∈ (0,1) such that
Fλ := (1 − λ)F0 + λF1 ∈ Md , it holds that
EARw(F0) ∩ EARw(F1) = ∅ =⇒ EARw(F0) ∩ EARw(F1) = EARw(Fλ).
(3.8)
Proposition 3.7 Suppose that Assumption 2.3 holds and R0 has a selective oriented
strict Md -identification function VR0 in the sense of (3.2). Then EARw , w ∈ Rd++,
satisfies the selective CxLS* property (3.8).
Proof Assume that k ∈ EARw(F0) ∩ EARw(F1). Then for λ ∈ (0,1) with Fλ ∈ Md ,
we obtain
V̄EARw(k,Fλ)(x) = (1 − λ)V̄R0(k + x,F0) + λV̄R0(k + x,F1) ≤ 0
for all x ∈ w⊥ and V̄R0(k,Fλ) = 0, hence EARw(F0) ∩ EARw(F1) ⊆ EARw(Fλ).
Now let 
 ∈ EARw(Fλ), but 





 /∈ EARw(F0) ∩ EARw(F1), both V̄R0(
,F0) and V̄R0(
,F1) must be
nonzero and of opposite signs. Assume without loss of generality that V̄R0(
,F0) < 0
and V̄R0(
,F0) > 0. For any k ∈ EARw(F0) ∩ EARw(F1), we have w
 = wk so
that 
 ∈ k +w⊥. This, however, leads to a contradiction since k ∈ EARw(F1) implies
V̄R0(x,F1) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ k + w⊥. 
If M is such that EARw is ‘truly set-valued’ on M, and in particular if it satis-
fies the proper subset property of Fissler et al. [25, Definition 3.4], i.e., there exist
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F,G ∈M such that ∅ = EARw(G)  EARw(F ) and M is convex, then [25, Theo-
rem 3.5] asserts that EARw is not exhaustively elicitable on M under the conditions
of Proposition 3.7.
Remark 3.8 We should like to compare the concept of identifiability introduced in
Proposition 3.6 to the discussion about the backtestability of loss value at risk in Big-
nozzi et al. [12, Sect. 5]. One can interpret the backtesting procedure suggested in [12]
as using a function-valued identification function as well. From that angle, the ana-
logue of (3.7) in the context of [12] would be that the infimum of the function-valued
identification function is 0 when using the correctly specified forecast. Interestingly,
this version of identifiability does not imply that the functional under consideration
satisfies one of the CxLS properties of [25, Sect. 3.1].
We end this section by noting that the identifiability of ρ and the selective identifi-
ability of R0 are even equivalent if  : Rd →R possesses a measurable right inverse.
Proposition 3.9 Let  : Rd → R be surjective with a measurable right inverse
η : R → Rd , i.e., η satisfies  ◦ η = idR. Assume that η(X) belongs to Yd for any
X ∈ Y . Then ρ is identifiable if and only if R0 is selectively identifiable.
Proof The ‘only if’ part is a special case of Theorem 3.1. For the ‘if’ part, assume
that VR0 : Rd × Rd → R is a strict selective Md -identification function for R0. For
any Y ∈ Yd , it holds that




Then for any s ∈ R and X ∈ Y , we obtain that
ρ(X) = s ⇐⇒ ρ(X + s) = 0 ⇐⇒ E[VR0
(
0, η(X + s))] = 0.
So ρ is identifiable with strict selective M-identification function Vρ : R×R →R,
Vρ(s, x) = VR0(0, η(x + s)). 
3.2 Elicitability results and mixture representation
In the seminal paper Ehm et al. [19], it is shown that subject to regularity conditions,
any nonnegative scoring function S : R × R → [0,∞] consistent for the α-quantile




Sθ (x, y)dH(θ), x, y ∈R, (3.9)
where H is a nonnegative measure on B(R) and Sθ , θ ∈ R, are nonnegative elemen-
tary scoring functions for the α-quantile (the τ -expectile). In particular, Sθ takes the
form
Sθ (x, y) = (1{θ<x} − 1{θ<y})V (θ, y), (3.10)
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where V is an oriented identification function for the α-quantile (the τ -expectile).
The score in (3.9) is strictly consistent if and only if the measure H is strictly posi-
tive, that is, puts positive mass on any open nonempty set. Ziegel [64] and Dawid [16]
argued that besides expectiles and quantiles, this construction also works for more
general one-dimensional functionals which admit an oriented identification function;
see Jordan et al. [43]. Steinwart et al. [58] showed that for one-dimensional function-
als satisfying certain regularity conditions, the existence of an oriented identification
function is equivalent to the elicitability of the functional. While the orientation of
the identification function immediately gives rise to the consistency of the elemen-
tary scores and thus of the mixtures in (3.9), an answer to the question as to whether
all nonnegative scoring functions for a certain functional are necessarily of the form
in (3.9) can typically only be answered by invoking Osband’s principle (see Fissler
and Ziegel [27] and Osband [55, Theorem 2.1]), hence assuming smoothness and
regularity conditions.
Our construction of strictly consistent exhaustive scoring functions for the sys-
temic risk measures R also exploits the key result in Theorem 3.1 about the existence
of oriented strict selective identification functions for R0 and is similar in nature to
the approach described above. For any y ∈Rd , we use the notation R(y) := R(δy).
Theorem 3.10 Let VR0 : Rd ×Rd → R be measurable in its first argument and such
that for all F ∈Md ∪ {δy : y ∈Rd}, we have
V̄R0(k,F ) ∈
{
(−∞,0], if k /∈ R(F),
[0,∞), if k ∈ R(F). (3.11)






is for each k ∈ Rd a nonnegative Md -consistent exhaustive scoring function for
R : Md → P̂(Rd ;Rd+).
(ii) Under Assumption 2.2 and if π is a σ -finite nonnegative measure on B(Rd),





is an Md -consistent exhaustive scoring function for R : Md → P̂(Rd ;Rd+).
(iii) If Assumption 2.3 holds, if for all F ∈ Md it holds that V̄R0(k,F ) < 0 for
k /∈ R(F) and V̄R0(k,F ) > 0 for k ∈ int(R(F )), and if π is a σ -finite strictly positive
measure on B(Rd), then the restriction of SR,π defined in (3.13) to F(Rd;Rd+) ×Rd
is strictly Md0 -consistent for the map R : Md0 → F(Rd;Rd+), where Md0 ⊆ Md is
such that S̄R,π (R(F ),F ) < ∞ for all F ∈Md0 .
For the proof of Theorem 3.10, we need the following lemma.
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Lemma 3.11 For any A1,A2 ∈ F(Rd;Rd+), the symmetric difference A1A2 de-
fined as (A1 \ A2) ∪ (A2 \ A1) is empty if and only if its interior int(A1A2) is
empty.
Proof If A1A2 = ∅, it is clear that int(A1A2) = ∅. Assume that there is an
x ∈ A1A2. Without loss of generality, we can assume that x ∈ A1 \ A2. As A2 is
closed, one can find r > 0 such that Br(x) ∩ A2 = ∅. Then there is ε > 0 such that
x + ε1 ∈ Br(x). Because A1 is an upper set, we also get that x + ε1 ∈ int(A1) which
shows that int(A1 \ A2) = ∅. 
Proof of Theorem 3.10 (i) Let F ∈Md ∪ {δy : y ∈Rd}, A ∈ P̂(Rd ;Rd+) and k ∈ Rd .
A direct calculation yields that
S̄R,k(A,F ) − S̄R,k
(
R(F),F
) = (1R(F)\A(k) − 1A\R(F)(k)
)
V̄R0(k,F ) ≥ 0,
where the last inequality is a direct consequence of (3.11). The nonnegativity of SR,k
follows by choosing F = δy , y ∈ Rd , which yields SR,k(A,y) ≥ SR,k(R(y), y) = 0.
Claim (ii) is a direct consequence of the nonnegativity and consistency of SR,k .
(iii) Let F ∈ Md and A∗ := R(F),A ∈ F(Rd ;Rd+) with A = A∗. Assume that
S̄R,π (A,F ), S̄R,π (A
∗,F ) < ∞ (otherwise, there is nothing to show). Using Fubini’s







Then Lemma 3.11 yields that int(A \A∗) = ∅ or int(A∗ \ A) = ∅. If int(A \ A∗) = ∅,
the fact that V̄ (·,F ) is strictly negative on (A∗)c and the assumption that π assigns
positive mass to any nonempty open set in B(Rd) implies
∫
A\A∗ V̄R0(k,F )π(dk) < 0,
which implies that S̄R,π (A,F ) − S̄R,π (A∗,F ) > 0. Assume int(A∗ \ A) = ∅. The
boundary ∂A∗ = R0(F ) is a closed set. That means that int(A∗ \A)\∂A∗ is open and







V̄R0(k,F )π(dk) > 0,
which implies that S̄R,π (A,F ) − S̄R,π (A∗,F ) > 0. A graphic illustration of the situ-
ation is provided in Figure 2. 
Note that condition (3.11) or the similar condition on V̄R0 in part (iii) of Theo-
rem 3.10 does not imply that VR0 is an identification function for R0. This relaxation
is particularly beneficial if ρ is value at risk and M contains discontinuous distribu-
tions, so that value at risk possibly fails to be identifiable on M.
3.2.1 Comparison with the one-dimensional case
The similarity of the mixture representations in (3.13) and (3.9) is obvious. With a
closer look, one can also see the similarities on the level of the elementary scores
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Fig. 2 A graphical illustration of the proof of Theorem 3.10 for dimension d = 2. The red region corre-
sponds to the correctly specified risk measure R(F) and the blue region to some misspecified forecast A.
The score difference S̄R,π (A,F ) − S̄R,π (R(F ),F ) is then an integral of V̄R0 (·,F ) over R(F) \ A (the
red-only region) plus an integral of −V̄R0 (·,F ) over A \ R(F) (the blue-only region)
given in (3.12) and (3.10). Indeed, (3.10) can be rewritten as





The form of R(y) is described explicitly in Lemma 3.12, where we use the fact that
ρ(ρ(0)) = ρ(0) − ρ(0) = 0.





− y = −1({ρ(0)}) +Rd+ − y.
Accounting for the sign convention that the negative of a quantile or an expectile
is a scalar risk measure, one can see that the elementary scores in (3.12) essentially
boil down to the ones in (3.10) for dimension d = 1.
3.2.2 Integrability
The nonnegativity of the elementary scores in (3.12) guarantees that the integral in
(3.13) always exists. However, as stated in part (iii) of Theorem 3.10, these scores
are only strictly consistent if S̄R,π (R(F ),F ) < ∞, which suggests the question as




|VR0(k, y)|π(dk) < ∞. Therefore, a sufficient condition for the finiteness of
S̄R,π (A,F ) is that VR0 is (π ⊗ F)-integrable.
3.2.3 Characterisation of all consistent scoring functions
There is evidence that—under appropriate regularity conditions—all consistent scor-
ing functions for the risk measure R are equivalent to a score of the form given
in (3.13). This means that modulo equivalence, the choice of the consistent scoring
function boils down to the choice of the measure π .
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First, note that Proposition 3.4 implies that it does not matter which ori-
ented strict Md -identification VR0 we actually start with. Indeed, if V ′R0 were
another such identification function, then V ′R0(k, y) = h(k)VR0(k, y) for some
strictly positive function h. But this only amounts to a change of measure as
VR0(k, y)π(dk) = V ′R0(k, y)π ′(dk), where π ′ has the density 1/h with respect to π .
Secondly, the class of scoring functions of the form (3.13) is convex, which is a
necessary condition; see Gneiting [35, Theorem 2]. Thirdly, as observed above, the
mixture representation in (3.13) is the natural extension of the one-dimensional case.
To answer the question whether indeed all scoring functions for R are equivalent to
a score of the form given in (3.13), one would need to generalise Osband’s principle
from the finite-dimensional case in Fissler and Ziegel [27] to the infinite-dimensional
setting of reporting upper sets in F(Rd ;Rd+).
3.2.4 Order-sensitivity
Under weak assumptions on ρ, all strictly consistent scoring functions S for ρ are
order-sensitive or accuracy-rewarding; see Nau [52, Proposition 3], Lambert [49,
Proposition 1], Bellini and Bignozzi [9, Proposition 3.4]. In the scalar setting, this
property means that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ρ(F ) or ρ(F ) ≤ x2 ≤ x1 implies S̄(x1,F ) ≥ S̄(x2,F ).
That is, if two forecasts are on the same side of the true value of the risk measure, the
closer the forecast is to the risk measure the better, evaluated in terms of the expected
score. While one gets this useful property essentially ‘for free’ in the scalar case,
asking for order-sensitivity in a multivariate setting is a lot more involved; see Fissler
and Ziegel [29]. One of the main questions in the multivariate setting is which order
relation to use. In the present situation where our exhaustive action domain consists
of closed upper subsets of Rd , the canonical (partial) order relation is the subset
relation. This means that the canonical analogue of order-sensitivity in our setting is
that for any distribution F ∈ Md , it holds that A ⊆ B ⊆ R(F) or A ⊇ B ⊇ R(F)
implies that S̄R,π (A,F ) ≥ S̄R,π (B,F ).
Proposition 3.13 Let the assumptions of Theorem 3.10 (ii) prevail. Then the scoring
function SR,π defined in (3.13) is Md -order-sensitive for R in the sense that for all
A,B ∈ P̂(Rd ;Rd+) and all F ∈ Md , we have
(
A ⊆ B ⊆ R(F) or A ⊇ B ⊇ R(F)) =⇒ S̄R,π (A,F ) ≥ S̄R,π (B,F ).
Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.10 (iii) and if S̄R,π (B,F ) < ∞, it holds that
(
A B ⊆ R(F) or A  B ⊇ R(F)) =⇒ S̄R,π (A,F ) > S̄R,π (B,F ).
Proof For the first part, it is enough to show order-sensitivity for the elementary
scores SR,k in (3.12). Let A ⊆ B ⊆ R(F). Then for any k ∈ Rd , (3.11) yields
S̄R,k(A,F ) − S̄R,k(B,F ) = 1B\A(k)V̄R0(k,F ) ≥ 0. On the other hand, if we have
A ⊇ B ⊇ R(F), then S̄R,k(A,F ) − S̄R,k(B,F ) = −1A\B(k)V̄R0(k,F ) ≥ 0 again by
(3.11). The second part follows along the lines of the proof of Theorem 3.10 (iii). 
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3.2.5 Forecast dominance and Murphy diagrams
The notion of (strict) consistency implies that—in expectation—a correctly specified
forecast will score at most as high as (strictly less than) any misspecified forecast.
On the level of the prediction space setting (see Gneiting and Ranjan [38], Strähl
and Ziegel [59]), which is also sketched in Sect. 1.2 after (1.2), Holzmann and Eu-
lert [41] showed that for two ideal forecasts, the one measurable with respect to a
strictly larger information set is preferred under any strictly consistent scoring func-
tion; see Tsyplakov [61]. Patton [56] demonstrated that in general, two misspecified
forecasts rank differently under different (consistent) scoring functions. Therefore,
the choice of the scoring function used in practice matters, and secondary quality cri-
teria besides consistency, such as translation-invariance or homogeneity, may guide
the decision on what scoring function to use; see Fissler et al. [26, Sect. 4] for results
in the current context. For the rare situation when one forecast scores better than an-
other uniformly over all consistent scoring functions, Ehm et al. [19] coined the term
forecast dominance. We give the corresponding definition here for the situation of
exhaustive forecasts for systemic risk measures R.
Definition 3.14 Let Y ∈ Yd and let A,B be two (stochastic) forecasts for some sys-
temic risk measure R of the form in (2.1) which take values in P̂(Rd ;Rd+). Then A
dominates B if E[SR,π (A,Y )] ≤ E[SR,π (B,Y )] for all consistent scoring functions
SR,π of the form (3.13), where π is a σ -finite nonnegative measure on B(Rd).
Note that the expectations are taken over the joint distribution of the forecasts and
the observation, implicitly assuming joint measurability of SR,π in both arguments.
Since the scores SR,π in (3.13) are parametrised by the class of nonnegative
σ -additive measures on B(Rd), it is not very handy to check forecast dominance
in practice by using the definition. To this end, the following corollary is helpful. The
proof is straightforward and therefore omitted.
Corollary 3.15 Let Y ∈ Yd and let A,B be two (stochastic) forecasts for some sys-
temic risk measure R of the form (2.1) which take values in P̂(Rd;Rd+). Then A
dominates B if and only if E[SR,k(A,Y )] ≤ E[SR,k(B,Y )] for all elementary scores
SR,k given in (3.12), where k ∈Rd .
Corollary 3.15 opens the way to an immediate multivariate analogue of Murphy
diagrams considered in Ehm et al. [19]. That is, if A is a P̂(Rd ;Rd+)-valued forecast
of a systemic risk measure R and Y is the corresponding Rd -valued observation of a
financial system, we can consider the map
R
d  k → sA(k) = E[SR,k(A,Y )] (3.14)
(also referred to as a Murphy diagram) as a diagnostic tool. For an empirical setting
with observations Y1, . . . , YN ∈ Rd and forecasts A1, . . . ,AN ∈ P̂(Rd;Rd+), (3.14)
takes the form
R




SR,k(At , Yt ). (3.15)
We illustrate the practical usage of Murphy diagrams in Sect. 5.2.
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3.2.6 Selective elicitability
Having established the exhaustive elicitability and selective identifiability of systemic
risk measures R : Md → A defined in (2.1), one may wonder about their selective
elicitability. As defined in Fissler et al. [25], a selective scoring function is a map
s : Rd × Rd → R∗. It is strictly Md -consistent for R if s̄(x,F ) ≤ s̄(k,F ) for all
F ∈ Md , k ∈ Rd and x ∈ R(F), where equality implies that k ∈ R(F). R is called
selectively elicitable on Md if there exists a strictly Md -consistent selective scoring
function for it.
The mutual exclusivity result of [25, Theorem 3.7] asserts that under mild condi-
tions, a set-valued functional cannot be both selectively and exhaustively elicitable.
One of the conditions for this mutual exclusivity result is that R satisfies the proper
subset property in the sense that there are F,G ∈ Md such that ∅ = R(G)  R(F).
In the given context, R satisfies the proper subset property as can be seen by invok-
ing the monotonicity or the cash-invariance of R. Another condition is that for all
ε ∈ (0,1), there exists some λ0 ∈ (0, ε) such that (1 − λ0)F + λ0G ∈ Md . Finally,
one needs to impose a certain finiteness assumption. The technical details are sum-
marised in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.16 Under the conditions of Theorem 3.10 (iii) and additionally assuming
the convexity of Md0 introduced there, it holds that if there is a strictly M
d
0 -consistent
exhaustive scoring function SR,π : F(Rd;Rd+) × Rd → R∗ for R such that the ex-
pected score S̄R,π (A,F ) is finite for all F ∈ Md0 and A ∈ F(Rd ;Rd+), then R fails
to be selectively elicitable on Md0 .
Proof The proof follows from [25, Proposition 3.3 and Theorem 3.5]. Note that while
[25, Theorem 3.5] uses the finiteness assumption on the expected exhaustive scoring
function, [25, Proposition 3.3] does not need such a finiteness assumption on the
expected selective scoring function. 
4 Elicitability of systemic risk measures based on expected shortfall
As described in Sect. 1.2, the last decade has seen a lively debate about which risk
measure to use in practice. The main focus has been on the dichotomy between the
law-invariant measures value at risk (VaRα) and expected shortfall (ESα) at probabil-
ity level α ∈ (0,1). Recall that
VaRα(F ) = − inf{x ∈R : α ≤ F(x)} ∈R, (4.1)


















where I = (−∞,−VaRα(F )].
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Recall that Theorems 3.1 and 3.10 establish identifiability and elicitability results
for systemic risk measures based on a scalar risk measure ρ which is identifiable, and
therefore—under weak regularity assumption—elicitable; see Steinwart et al. [58].
Moreover, Proposition 3.9 establishes that under weak regularity conditions, the iden-
tifiability of ρ is also necessary for the identifiability and elicitability of the systemic
risk measure based on ρ. Therefore, RESα (Y ) = {k ∈ Rd : ESα((Y + k)) ≤ 0} in
general fails to be elicitable. On the other hand, the pair (VaRα,ESα) is elicitable
under weak regularity conditions; see Acerbi and Szekely [1] and Fissler and Ziegel
[27]. This might trigger the suspicion that the pair (RVaRα ,RESα ) mapping to the
product space F(Rd;Rd+) × F(Rd ;Rd+) is exhaustively elicitable. We conjecture,
however, that (RVaRα ,RESα ) in general fails to have the exhaustive CxLS property
for d ≥ 2, ruling out its exhaustive elicitability. The risk measure RVaRα (Y ) only en-
codes information about the sign of VaRα((Y + k)) for each k ∈ Rd . Apart from
k ∈ RVaRα0 (Y ), we know nothing about the actual size of VaRα((Y + k)). The pos-
itive result about the elicitability of the pair (VaRα,ESα), however, exploits the fact
that for the scoring function Sα(x, y) = −(1{y≤−x} −α)x/α−1{y≤−x}y/α, x, y ∈R,
VaRα(F ) is the minimiser of the expected score S̄α(x,F ), while ESα(F ) is its mini-
mum; see Frongillo and Kash [34]. Therefore, we consider the function-valued func-
tional T VaRα : Yd →RRd , where for each Y ∈ Yd ,
T VaRα (Y ) : Rd →R, Rd  k → T VaRα (Y )(k) = VaRα
(
(Y + k)). (4.2)
4.1 Identifiability results
Let Minc,cont ⊆ M be the subclass of continuous and strictly increasing distribu-
tion functions in M. Let Mdinc,cont ⊆ Md be the subclass of distributions such
that for any Y ∼ F ∈ Mdinc,cont, the distribution of (Y + k) is in Minc,cont for
all k ∈ Rd . A strict Minc,cont-identification function V : R2 × R → R2 for the pair
(VaRα,ESα) : M →R×R∗ is given, for (v, e) ∈R2 and y ∈ R, by
V (v, e, y) =
(
α − 1{y+v≤0}
e + 1{y+v≤0}y/α + (1{y+v≤0} − α)v/α
)
,
which can be verified by a straightforward calculation. This function induces a (non-
strict) selective Md -identification function U : RRd × Rd × Rd → R2 for the pair
(T VaRα ,R
ESα
0 ) : Md → RR




1{(y+k)≤−v(k)}(y + k)/α + (1{(y+k)≤−v(k)} − α)v(k)/α
)
. (4.3)
Proposition 4.1 For any F ∈Md , the component U2 of U defined in (4.3) is oriented
in the sense that
Ū2
(





< 0, if k /∈ RESα (F ),
= 0, if k ∈ RESα0 (F ),
> 0, if k ∈ RESα (F ) \ RESα0 (F )
(4.4)
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for any k ∈ Rd . Moreover, U is a selective Mdinc,cont-identification function for the
pair (T VaRα ,RESα0 ) : Md → RR
d × 2Rd .



























< 0, if k /∈ RESα (F ),
= 0, if k ∈ RESα0 (F ),
> 0, if k ∈ RESα (F ) \ RESα0 (F ),
where (Y + k) ∼ F(Y+k). If F ∈ Mdinc,cont, then Ū1(T VaRα (F ), k,F ) = 0. 
4.2 Elicitability results
We introduce the following regularity assumption on T VaRα defined in (4.2).
Assumption 4.2 The functional T VaRα : Mdinc,cont → RR
d
takes values in C(Rd ;R),
the space of continuous functions from Rd to R.
Clearly, Assumption 4.2 is satisfied if  is continuous. For any increasing function
g : R → R, introduce Sα,g(x, y) = (1{y≤x} − α)(g(x) − g(y)). Recall from Gneiting
[36, Theorem 2.6] that Sα,g is a nonnegative consistent selective scoring function
for the α-quantile. Moreover, if g is strictly increasing, Sα,g is a strictly consistent
selective scoring function for the α-quantile relative to any class M of distributions
such that g is M-integrable; see Gneiting [36].
Theorem 4.3 (i) Under Assumption 2.2, for every k ∈Rd , the function
Sk : RRd × P̂(Rd;Rd+) ×Rd → [0,∞),
Sk(v,A,y) = −1A(k)U2(v, k, y) − 1RESα (y)(k)(y + k) (4.5)
is a nonnegative Md -consistent exhaustive scoring function for the pair
(T VaRα ,RESα ) : Md → RRd × P̂(Rd;Rd+).
(ii) Under Assumption 2.2 and if π1,π2 are σ -finite nonnegative measures on
B(Rd), the map
Sπ1,π2 : RR
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where the function gk : R →R is increasing and Sk is given in (4.5) for each k ∈ Rd ,
is a nonnegative Md -consistent exhaustive scoring function for
(T VaRα ,RESα ) : Md → RRd × P̂(Rd;Rd+).
(iii) If Assumptions 2.3 and 4.2 hold, if gk is strictly increasing for all k ∈ Rd
and if π1, π2 are strictly positive, then the restriction of Sπ1,π2 defined in (4.6)
to C(Rd ;R) ×F(Rd ;Rd+) ×Rd is a nonnegative strictly Mdinc,cont;0-consistent ex-
haustive scoring function for (T VaRα ,RESα ) : Mdinc,cont;0 → C(Rd ;R)×F(Rd;Rd+),
where Mdinc,cont;0 ⊆ Mdinc,cont is such that S̄π1,π2(T VaRα (F ),RESα (F ),F ) < ∞ for
all F ∈ Mdinc,cont;0.
Proof (i) Let F ∈ Md , v ∈ RRd , A ∈ P̂(Rd ;Rd+) and take v∗ = T VaRα (F ),
A∗ = RESα (F ) and k ∈ Rd . If S̄k(v,A,F ) = ∞, there is nothing to show. So we
assume that S̄k(v,A,F ) is finite. Consider
S̄k(v,A,F ) − S̄k(v∗,A,F ) = 1A(k)





( − v(k),(Y + k))
− Sα,id
( − v∗(k),(Y + k))]
≥ 0,
since Sα,id is consistent for the α-quantile. If S̄k(v∗,A,F ) = ∞, we are done. Other-
wise, consider
S̄k(v




Ū2(v, k,F ) ≥ 0,
where the inequality follows from (4.4) and establishes the consistency of Sk . To-
gether with the fact that Sk(T VaRα (δy),RESα (δy), y) = 0, this implies the nonnega-
tivity of Sk .
(ii) S0,π2 is Md -consistent for (T VaRα ,RESα ) : Md → RRd × P̂(Rd ;Rd+) due
to (i). Since Sα,gk is a consistent selective scoring function for the α-quantile, the
assertion follows by invoking Fubini’s theorem.
(iii) Let F ∈ Mdinc,cont;0, v ∈ C(Rd ;R), A ∈ F(Rd;Rd+) and v∗ = T VaRα (F ),
A∗ = RESα (F ). If v = v∗, then K = {k ∈ Rd : v(k) = v∗(k)} = ∅ is open. If
S̄π1,π2(v,A,F ) = ∞, there is nothing to show. Otherwise,







( − v(k),(Y + k)) − Sα,gk








( − v(k),(Y + k)) − Sα,id
( − v∗(k),(Y + k))]π2(dk)
is positive, where the first integral is strictly positive and the second is nonnegative
(and strictly positive if and only if π2(A ∩ K) > 0).
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If A = A∗, then EF [Sπ1,π2(v∗,A,Y )−Sπ1,π2(v∗,A∗, Y )] > 0, which follows with
similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.10 (iii). 
Theorem 4.3 (ii) suggests that there is again the possibility to consider Murphy
diagrams to assess the quality of forecasts for (T VaRα ,RESα ) simultaneously over all
scoring functions given in (4.6). However, a direct implementation would amount to
defining them on the 2d-dimensional Euclidean space. If one further decomposes the
functions gk in the spirit of Ehm et al. [19], one would even end up with a map defined
on R×Rd ×Rd . However, arguing along the lines of Ziegel et al. [65], the measure
π1 only accounts for forecast accuracy in the VaR component. Therefore, if interest
focuses on the ES component, it makes sense to set π1 = 0 to facilitate the analysis.
This implies that one can consider the Murphy diagram Rd  k → E[Sk(v,A,Y )]
with the elementary scores Sk given in (4.5). The empirical formulation in the spirit
of (3.15) is straightforward.
5 Examples and simulations
5.1 Consistency of the exhaustive scoring function for R
In this section, we demonstrate via a simulation study the discrimination ability of the
consistent exhaustive scoring functions constructed in Theorem 3.10. We do so in the
context of the prediction space setting introduced in Gneiting and Ranjan [38]. This
means that we explicitly model the information sets of each forecaster. For the sake of
simplicity and following Gneiting et al. [37] and Fissler and Ziegel [30], we choose to
consider only one-step-ahead forecasts and prediction–observation sequences that are
independent and identically distributed over time. Despite this simplification, there
are still a variety of parameters to consider in the simulation study:
(i) the dimension d of the financial system;
(ii) the (unconditional) distribution of Yt ;
(iii) the aggregation function ;
(iv) the scalar risk measure ρ;
(v) the competing forecasts At and Bt , along with their joint distributions with Yt ;
(vi) the measure π (and thus the scoring function SR,π );
(vii) the time horizon N .
We confine ourselves to the following choices of these parameters.
(i)–(iii) We work with two different combinations of Yt and . In both cases, we
work with a financial system of d = 5 participants.
(a) The vector Yt models the gains and losses of the participants in the system.
At any time point t , Yt = μt + εt , where the risk factor μt follows a 5-dimensional
normal distribution with mean 0, correlations 0.5 and variances 1, and εt follows
a 5-dimensional standard normal distribution. Moreover, μt and εt are independent
for all t . Thus conditionally on μt , Yt has distribution N5(μt , I5), whereas uncon-
ditionally, Yt ∼ N5(0,) with ij = 0.5 for i, j = 1, . . . ,5, i = j and 2 otherwise.
Following the suggestion of Amini et al. [4], the aggregation function 1 is of the
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i,t , and we set β = 0.75. In this way,
both gains and losses influence the value of the aggregation function, but the losses
have a higher weight.
(b) We consider an extended model of Eisenberg and Noe [20]; see Feinstein
et al. [23]. The participants have liabilities towards each other, and Lij,t repre-
sents the nominal liability of participant i towards participant j at time point t , for
i, j = 1, . . . ,5. Moreover, each participant i owes an amount Lis,t to society at time
point t . To simplify the simulations and shorten the computing time, we assume that
the liabilities matrix is deterministic and constant in time so that we can write Lis
and Lij instead of Lis,t and Lij,t . Moreover, we denote by L̄s = ∑di=1 Lis the sum
of all payments promised to society. The vector Yt represents the endowments of the
participants at time point t . As suggested in [20], if some of the endowments are neg-
ative, we introduce a so-called sink node and interpret the negative endowments as
liabilities towards this node. The value of the aggregation function 2 corresponds to
the sum of all payments society obtains in the clearing process as described in [20],
lowered by 90% of the amount promised to society to ensure that the aggregation
function can attain both positive and negative values. This ensures that the system is
acceptable if ρ applied to the sum of all payments society obtains does not exceed
−0.9L̄s ; see also [23]. To simulate the endowments Yt of the participants, we assume
that Yit = (μit + εit )2 for i = 1, . . . ,5 with μt and εt specified in (a). We construct
the system in the following way: The probability of a participant owing to another
participant is 0.8. If there is a liability from i to j , its nominal value is 2. In addition,
each participant owes 2 to society.
(iv) For ρ, we consider the scalar risk measures VaRα and ESα , α ∈ (0,1), as well
as the expectile-based version of VaR defined as EVaRτ (X) = −eτ (X), τ ∈ (0,1),
where the expectile eτ is the unique solution to the equation
τE[(X − eτ )+] = (1 − τ)E[(X − eτ )−]
for X ∈ L1(,R); see Newey and Powell [53]. For the interpretation of expectile-
based risk measures in finance, we refer to Bellini and Di Bernardino [10]; for a
novel economic angle, see Ehm et al. [19]. Using the standard identification functions
for VaRα and EVaRτ from Gneiting [35] and the explicit construction in (3.1), the
selective identification function for R0 is given by VR0(k, y) = α − 1{(k+y)≤0} for
ρ = VaRα , and by VR0(k, y) = τ((k + y))+ − (1 − τ)((k + y))− for ρ = EVaRτ .
As mentioned in Sect. 4, if the focus is on ESα , we can and do set the measure π1
to 0 in (4.6), meaning that no particular choice of a scoring or identification function
need be made for this risk measure.
(v) We consider two ideal forecasters with different information sets. Anne has
access to the risk factor μt and uses the correct conditional distribution of Yt given




) = R(N5(05, I5)






Here, Nd(m,)2 denotes the distribution of a random vector (X21, . . . ,X2d) with
(X1, . . . ,Xd)
 ∼ Nd(m,). On the other hand, Bob does not use information about
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the risk factor μt . Therefore he uses the correct unconditional distribution of Yt for











(vi) We choose π to be a 5-dimensional Gaussian measure with mean m ∈R5 and
covariance I5. We also set π2 = π in (4.6). To enhance the discrimination ability of
the score SR,π , we choose m close to the boundary of R(Yt ). Here we work with
m = 2 × 1 as this value appears to be fairly close to Bob’s unconditional forecasts in
all cases. This choice of π turns out to be beneficial with respect to integrability con-
siderations and renders our scores finite. Indeed, since VR0 for ρ = VaRα is bounded,
it is π ⊗ F -integrable for any finite measure π . In the case of ρ = EVaRτ , more con-
siderations are necessary. From the construction of 2, it is clear that it is a bounded
function; in particular, the values lie in the interval [−0.9L̄s,∑di=1 Lis − 0.9L̄s].
This in turn implies that the identification function VR0 is bounded. Therefore VR0
is π ⊗ F -integrable for any finite measure π . Finally, since 1 only grows linearly
and both π and Yt are Gaussian, the integrability is also guaranteed in this case. Simi-
lar considerations confirm that the sufficient integrability conditions are also satisfied
for ρ = ESα .
(vii) We work with sample sizes N = 250, a good proxy for the number of working
(and trading) days in a year. In a financial context, the two forecasters Anne and Bob
could be both portfolio managers or regulators. While 1 would be an appropriate
aggregation function if Anne and Bob are portfolio managers, 2 would be more ap-
propriate for regulators. The choices of including or omitting information contained
in the risk factor μt might stem from different data access, or deliberate different
choices of risk factors. From a different angle, Bob might deliberately choose to use
the unconditional profit and loss distribution to come up with a more prudent risk
measurement approach than Anne who uses the conditional distribution; see McNeil
et al. [51, Sect. 9.2.1].
To compare Anne’s with Bob’s forecast performance, we employ the classical
Diebold–Mariano test [17] based on the scoring functions SR,π of the form (3.13) and
(4.6). We repeat the experiment 1000 times for setting (a) and 100 times for setting
(b) since due to the presence of clearing, the computation time tends to be quite
lengthy in setting (b). We approximate π with a Monte Carlo draw of size 100 000.
The computations are performed with the statistics software R, and in particular its
Rcpp package to also integrate parts of C++ code to enhance the computational
speed.
We consider tests with two different one-sided null hypotheses. The null hypothe-
sis H0 : E[SR,π (A1, Y1)] ≥ E[SR,π (B1, Y1)], or in short H0 : A  B , means that Bob
has a better forecast performance than Anne on average, evaluated in terms of SR,π .
On the other hand, the null hypothesis H0 : E[SR,π (A1, Y1)] ≤ E[SR,π (B1, Y1)] or
H0 : A  B stands for asserting that Anne’s forecasts are superior to Bob’s on aver-
age, in terms of SR,π . In Table 1, we report the relative frequencies of rejections for
the respective null hypotheses. Invoking the sensitivity of consistent scoring func-
tions with respect to increasing information sets established in Holzmann and Eulert
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Table 1 Ratios of rejections of the null hypotheses at significance level 0.05
H0 VaR0.01 VaR0.05 ES0.01 ES0.05 EVaR0.01 EVaR0.05
1 A  B 0.995 0.940 0.948 1.000 1.000 1.000
A  B 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 A  B 0.740 0.870 0.670 0.770 0.790 0.900
A  B 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[41], we expect that Anne’s forecasts are deemed superior to Bob’s predictions. And
in fact, the null A  B is never rejected for either scenario, while A  B is rejected in
between 67% and 100% of all experiments over the various scenarios. In particular,
with rejection rates for H0 : A  B between 0.94 and 1, we observe that the discrim-
ination ability between Bob and Anne is considerably higher for model (a) than for
(b), where we obtain rejection rates ranging from 0.67 to 0.90. This might be due to
the fact that 1 is unbounded whereas 2 only takes values between 0 and L̄s , which
might translate into a smaller influence of the predictive distributions upon which the
forecasts are based. Moreover, for fixed probability level α = τ , both in case (a)
and (b), the number of instances when Anne’s forecasts are preferred to Bob’s is the
highest for ρ = EVaRα and the lowest for ρ = ESα , with the exception of ES0.05
in case (a). This ordering might be in line with the observation that a normally dis-
tributed X is deemed differently risky with respect to the three risk measures consid-
ered when evaluated at the same probability level: EVaRα(X) ≤ VaRα(X) ≤ ESα(X)
for α ∈ (0,0.5), see Nolde and Ziegel [54, Table 1].
5.2 Murphy diagrams and comparative backtests
We illustrate the use of Murphy diagrams, following Corollary 3.15. We work within
case (a) of Sect. 5.1 with d = 2. In particular, we have Yt = μt + εt , where μt follows
a 2-dimensional normal distribution with mean 0, variances 1 and correlations 0.5,
and εt follows a 2-dimensional standard normal distribution. As the scalar risk mea-
sure ρ, we only consider VaR0.05, and we use the aggregation function 1 : R2 →R,
i.e., (x) = 0.25(x+1 + x+2 ) − 0.75(x−1 + x−2 ). We should like to combine this with
an illustration of the Murphy diagrams in the context of comparative backtests as in-
troduced in Fissler et al. [31] and further developed in Nolde and Ziegel [54]. To this
end, suppose Bob’s ideal unconditional risk measure forecasts Bt = R(N2(02,))
play the role of the regulator’s standardised procedure. Then we have two internal
risk measurement procedures making use of the additional risk factor given by μt .
The first are Anne’s ideal forecasts At = R(N2(μt , I2)) = R(N2(0, I2)) − μt . The
second are Celia’s forecasts. Confused about different sign conventions in the litera-
ture, she issues sign-reversed forecasts Ct assuming that Yt ∼ N2(−μt , I2), resulting
in the forecasts Ct = R(N2(−μt , I2)) = R(N2(0, I2)) + μt . Again, we consider a
time horizon of N = 250.
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Fig. 3 (Left) Differences ŝ250,B (k)− ŝ250,f (k) of empirical Murphy diagrams from (3.15) versus k ∈ R2
for f = A (top) and f = C (bottom). (Right) Three-zone traffic light illustration of pointwise comparative
backtests following Fissler et al. [31]. The green area corresponds to the region where the null H+0 : B  f
is rejected, the red one is where H−0 : B  f is rejected, at level 0.05, respectively. Yellow means that
neither H+0 nor H
−
0 is rejected. In the grey region, the two Murphy diagrams coincide identically
In the left panel of Fig. 3, we illustrate the differences of empirical Murphy dia-
grams,





SR,k(Bt , Yt ) − SR,k(ft , Yt )
)
,
where ft ∈ {At,Ct } stands for either of the two internal procedures produced by
Anne or Celia. For the comparison of Bob vs. Anne, we can see that the Murphy dia-
gram ŝ250,B(k)− ŝ250,A(k) is mostly nonnegative, indicating the superiority of Anne’s
more informed forecast over Bob’s prudential unconditional one. On the other hand,
comparing Bob vs. Celia, the Murphy diagram ŝ250,B(k) − ŝ250,C(k) is nonpositive
everywhere. This means that all elementary scores indicate the inferiority of Celia’s
sign-reversed forecasts. The regions with the highest score differences (in absolute
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values) seem to correspond to a blurred version of the boundary of the considered
risk measure forecasts. Quite intuitively, the magnitude of the score difference with a
maximum of approximately 0.05 is smaller when comparing the two ideal forecasts
issued by Bob and Anne in comparison to the situation involving the sign-reversed
Celia, where the maximal difference between the Murphy diagrams is in magnitude
larger than 0.15. We have performed this experiment several times and observed that
the stylised facts are qualitatively stable, though there is still recognisable sample
variation present. For transparency reasons, we have depicted the first experiment
performed, reporting some more experiments in [26, Supplementary Material].
In the right panel of Fig. 3, we depict the results of pointwise comparative back-
tests using the traffic-light illustration suggested in [31], which is the analogue for
comparative backtests to the three-zone approach for traditional backtests in [7, Ap-
pendix B, Sect. III]. In other words, we perform two Diebold–Mariano tests using the
elementary score SR,k for each k in a grid of [−5,5]2 at a significance level of 0.05.
The grid cell is coloured in green if the conservative null hypothesis H+0 : B  f is
rejected. This means that the internal procedure f performs significantly better than
Bob’s standardised procedure in terms of SR,k . In contrast, the grid cell is depicted
in red if the null H−0 : B  f is rejected, which indicates that the standardised pro-
cedure is significantly superior to the internal risk measurement procedure. For all k
in the yellow region, none of the two nulls is rejected, meaning that the procedure
is indecisive at significance level 0.05. Finally, the grey area corresponds to those
points where the score difference is constantly zero for all t = 1, . . . ,N . Due to the
vanishing variance, a Diebold–Mariano test is not possible there. But clearly, this still
means that the two forecasts are just equally good in that region.
The specific results nicely correspond to the situations obtained in the left panel
of Fig. 3. For both pairwise comparisons and for k close to the four corners of the
area [−5,5]2, the score differences vanish identically, resulting in a grey coloura-
tion. Again, in both cases, there is a ‘continuous’ behaviour in that the grey region
adjoins a yellow stripe before turning into a fairly broad green or red stripe. For the
comparison involving Celia, it is reassuring that a substantial region is coloured in
red. In this region, the procedure is decisive, deeming Celia significantly inferior to
Bob. Moreover, for this particular simulation, there is no green region. The situation
comparing the two ideal forecasters Anne and Bob is somewhat more involved. Most
points k are coloured in green or yellow/grey, so that either Anne’s more informed
forecasts are deemed significantly superior to Bob’s standardised forecasts or the pro-
cedure is indecisive between the two methods. However, there is a small red stripe
close to the upper right corner. For k in that region and for this particular simulation,
this means that Bob’s forecasts outperform Anne’s. While this observation is some-
what unexpected, it reflects the finite sample nature of the simulation, rendering such
outcomes possible. Having a look at some more experiments [26, Supplementary
Material] shows that this red region is not stable over different simulations (which
would clearly violate the sensitivity of consistent scoring functions with respect to
increasing information sets established in Holzmann and Eulert [41]), but moves and
occasionally also vanishes (on the region [−5,5]2 considered). Interestingly, in all
events with a red region present, this red region was located roughly in a similar area.
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6 Summary and discussion
We briefly summarise the various elicitability and identifiability results established in
this paper for the set-valued systemic risk measure R defined in (2.1) and its derived
quantities. If the underlying scalar risk measure ρ is identifiable, R0 of the form (2.3)
is selectively identifiable. Using a somewhat generalised concept of identifiability and
exploiting an orientation argument, this implies that R itself is selectively identifiable.
Under further regularity conditions, it even leads to the selective identifiability of
EARw introduced in (2.5), with function-valued identification functions. On the other
hand, the selective identifiability of R0 together with an orientation argument leads
to the exhaustive elicitability of R under appropriate conditions. Moreover, since
(under mild conditions) there is a one-to-one relationship between R and R0, this also
implies the exhaustive elicitability of R0. In view of the mutual exclusivity result in
Fissler et al. [25], the exhaustive elicitability of R rules out its selective elicitability
in the sense of [25]; see Theorem 3.16. The findings of [25] plus the fact that the
functional EARw possesses the selective CxLS* property imply that EARw cannot be
exhaustively elicitable; the question of selective elicitability remains open in this case.
Following the idea of joint elicitability that led to the remedy for the non-elicitabil-
ity problem of expected shortfall, Sect. 4 presents a way of achieving selective identi-
fiability and exhaustive elicitability of systemic risk measures based on ESα , by using
a different functional based on VaRα .
The identifiability and elicitability results presented in this paper open the way
to traditional and comparative backtests as described in Nolde and Ziegel [54], em-
ploying Diebold–Mariano tests and calibration tests as demonstrated in Sect. 5. This
might be interesting both in a regulatory framework and for internal risk assessment
of companies with different units. In an even more statistical direction, one can em-
ploy strictly consistent scores to perform M-estimation for set-valued systemic risk
measures. This would require an optimisation over a collection of subsets, such as
F(Rd ;Rd+), which is computationally challenging. This might be alleviated by tran-
sitioning to a parametric (auto-)regression framework for set-valued systemic risk
measures, see Dimitriadis and Bayer [18], so that the optimisation can be performed
over a finite-dimensional parameter space.
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Barančok who provided helpful comments in the context of equivariant scores, to Yuan Li for his careful
proofreading of an earlier version of this paper, and to Lukáš Šablica for helpful programming advice on
the simulation part of this project.
Funding Note Open Access funding provided by Vienna University of Economics and Business (WU).
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons
Elicitability and identifiability of set-valued measures of systemic risk 163
licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are in-
cluded in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material.
If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted
by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the
copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
References
1. Acerbi, C., Szekely, B.: Backtesting expected shortfall. Risk Mag. December, 76–81 (2014)
2. Acharya, V.V., Pedersen, L.H., Philippon, T., Richardson, M.: Measuring systemic risk. Rev. Financ.
Stud. 30, 2–47 (2016)
3. Adrian, T., Brunnermeier, M.K.: CoVaR. Am. Econ. Rev. 106, 1705–1741 (2016)
4. Amini, H., Filipovic, D., Minca, A.: Systemic risk and central clearing counterparty design. SIAM J.
Financ. Math. 11, 60–98 (2020)
5. Armenti, Y., Crépey, S., Drapeau, S., Papapantoleon, A.: Multivariate shortfall risk allocation and
systemic risk. SIAM J. Financ. Math. 9, 90–126 (2018)
6. Artzner, P., Delbaen, F., Eber, J.-M., Heath, D.: Coherent measures of risk. Math. Finance 9, 203–228
(1999)
7. Bank for International Settlements. Consultative Document: Fundamental review of the trading book:
a revised market risk framework. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013). Available online
at https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs265.pdf
8. Bank for International Settlements. Consultative Document: Fundamental review of the trading
book: Outstanding issues. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014). Available online at
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d305.htm
9. Bellini, F., Bignozzi, V.: On elicitable risk measures. Quant. Finance 15, 725–733 (2015)
10. Bellini, F., Di, E.: Bernardino. Risk management with expectiles. Eur. J. Finance 23, 487–506 (2017)
11. Biagini, F., Fouque, J.-P., Frittelli, M., Meyer-Brandis, T.: A unified approach to systemic risk mea-
sures via acceptance sets. Math. Finance 29, 329–367 (2019)
12. Bignozzi, W., Burzoni, M., Munari, C.: Risk measures based on benchmark loss distributions. J. Risk
Insur. 87, 437–475 (2020)
13. Chen, C., Iyengar, G., Moallemi, C.C.: An axiomatic approach to systemic risk. Manag. Sci. 59,
1373–1388 (2013)
14. Cont, R., Deguest, R., Scandolo, G.: Robustness and sensitivity analysis of risk measurement proce-
dures. Quant. Finance 10, 593–606 (2010)
15. Davis, M.H.A.: Verification of internal risk measure estimates. Stat. Risk. Model. 33, 67–93 (2016)
16. Dawid, P.: Contribution to the discussion of “Of quantiles and expectiles: Consistent scoring func-
tions, Choquet representations and forecast rankings” by Ehm, W., Gneiting, T., Jordan, A. and
Krüger, F. J. R. Stat. Soc., Ser. B, Stat. Methodol. 78, 534–535 (2016)
17. Diebold, F.X., Mariano, R.S.: Comparing predictive accuracy. J. Bus. Econ. Stat. 13, 253–263 (1995)
18. Dimitriadis, T., Bayer, S.: A joint quantile and expected shortfall regression framework. Electron. J.
Stat. 13, 1823–1871 (2019)
19. Ehm, W., Gneiting, T., Jordan, A., Krüger, F.: Of quantiles and expectiles: consistent scoring func-
tions, Choquet representations and forecast rankings. J. R. Stat. Soc., Ser. B, Stat. Methodol. 78,
505–533 (2016)
20. Eisenberg, L., Noe, T.H.: Systemic risk in financial networks. Manag. Sci. 47, 236–249 (2001)
21. Embrechts, P., Puccetti, G., Rüschendorf, L., Wang, R., Beleraj, A.: An academic response to Basel
3.5. Risks 2(1), 25–48 (2014)
22. Emmer, S., Kratz, M., Tasche, D.: What is the best risk measure in practice? A comparison of standard
risk measures. J. Risk 8, 31–60 (2015)
23. Feinstein, Z., Rudloff, B., Weber, S.: Measures of systemic risk. SIAM J. Financ. Math. 8, 672–708
(2017)
24. Fissler, T.: On Higher Order Elicitability and Some Limit Theorems on the Poisson and
Wiener Space. PhD Thesis, University of Bern (2017). Available online at http://biblio.unibe.ch/
download/eldiss/17fissler_t.pdf
164 T. Fissler et al.
25. Fissler, T., Frongillo, R., Hlavinová, J., Rudloff, B.: Forecast evaluation of set-valued functionals.
(2020). Preprint, available online at arXiv:1910.07912v2
26. Fissler, T., Hlavinová, J., Rudloff, B.: Elicitability and identifiability of systemic risk measures (2019).
Preprint, available online at arXiv:1907.01306v2
27. Fissler, T., Ziegel, J.F.: Higher order elicitability and Osband’s principle. Ann. Stat. 44, 1680–1707
(2016)
28. Fissler, T., Ziegel, J.F.: Erratum: Higher order elicitability and Osband’s principle. Ann. Stat. (2021),
forthcoming, https://doi.org/10.1214/20-AOS2014. Available online at arXiv:1901.08826v2
29. Fissler, T., Ziegel, J.F.: Order-sensitivity and equivariance of scoring functions. Electron. J. Stat. 13,
1166–1211 (2019)
30. Fissler, T., Ziegel, J.F.: Evaluating range value at risk forecasts (2020). Preprint, available online at
arXiv:1902.04489
31. Fissler, T., Ziegel, J.F., Gneiting, T.: Expected shortfall is jointly elicitable with value-at-risk: impli-
cations for backtesting. Risk Mag. January, 58–61 (2016)
32. Föllmer, H., Schied, A.: Convex measures of risk and trading constraints. Finance Stoch. 6, 429–447
(2002)
33. Föllmer, H., Schied, A.: Stochastic Finance: An Introduction in Discrete Time, 4th edn. de Gruyter,
Berlin (2016)
34. Frongillo, R., Kash, I.: On elicitation complexity. In: Cortes, C., et al. (eds.) Advances in Neural
Information Processing Systems, vol. 28, pp. 3258–3266. Curran Associates, Red Hook (2015)
35. Gneiting, T.: Making and evaluating point forecasts. J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 106, 746–762 (2011)
36. Gneiting, T.: Quantiles as optimal point forecasts. Int. J. Forecast. 27, 197–207 (2011)
37. Gneiting, T., Balabdaoui, F., Raftery, A.E.: Probabilistic forecasts, calibration and sharpness. J. R.
Stat. Soc., Ser. B, Stat. Methodol. 69, 243–268 (2007)
38. Gneiting, T., Ranjan, R.: Combining predictive distributions. Electron. J. Stat. 7, 1747–1782 (2013)
39. Hampel, F.R.: A general qualitative definition of robustness. Ann. Math. Stat. 42, 1887–1896 (1971)
40. Hoffmann, H., Meyer-Brandis, T., Svindland, G.: Risk-consistent conditional systemic risk measures.
Stoch. Process. Appl. 126, 2014–2037 (2016)
41. Holzmann, H., Eulert, M.: The role of the information set for forecasting – with applications to risk
management. Ann. Appl. Stat. 8, 79–83 (2014)
42. Huber, P.J., Ronchetti, E.M.: Robust Statistics, 2nd edn. Wiley, Hoboken (2009)
43. Jordan, A., Mühlemann, A., Ziegel, J.F.: Optimal solutions to the isotonic regression problem (2019).
Preprint, available online at arXiv:1904.04761
44. Jouini, E., Schachermayer, W., Touzi, N.: Law invariant risk measures have the Fatou property. In:
Kusuoka, S., Yamazaki, A. (eds.) Adv. Math. Econ., vol. 9, pp. 49–72. Springer, Tokyo (2006)
45. Koenker, R.: Quantile Regression. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2005)
46. Koenker, R., Basset, G.: Regression quantiles. Econometrica 46, 33–50 (1978)
47. Krätschmer, V., Schied, A., Zähle, H.: Comparative and qualitative robustness for law-invariant risk
measures. Finance Stoch. 18, 271–295 (2014)
48. Kromer, E., Overbeck, L., Zilch, K.: Systemic risk measures on general measurable spaces. Math.
Methods Oper. Res. 84, 323–357 (2016)
49. Lambert, N.: Elicitation and evaluation of statistical forecasts (2019). Preprint, available online at
http://ai.stanford.edu/~nlambert/papers/elicitability.pdf
50. Lambert, N., Pennock, D.M., Shoham, Y.: Eliciting properties of probability distributions. In: Pro-
ceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 129–138. Association for Com-
puting Machinery, Chicago (2008)
51. McNeil, A.J., Frey, R., Embrechts, P.: Quantitative Risk Management: Concepts, Techniques and
Tools, 2nd edn. Princeton University Press, Princeton (2015)
52. Nau, R.F.: Should scoring rules be ‘effective’? Manag. Sci. 31, 527–535 (1985)
53. Newey, W.K., Powell, J.L.: Asymmetric least squares estimation and testing. Econometrica 55, 819–
847 (1987)
54. Nolde, N., Ziegel, J.F.: Elicitability and backtesting: perspectives for banking regulation. Ann. Appl.
Stat. 11(1833–1874), 12 (2017)
55. Osband, K.H.: Providing Incentives for Better Cost Forecasting. PhD Thesis, University of California,
Berkeley (1985). Available online at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4355667.
56. Patton, A.J.: Comparing possibly misspecified forecasts. J. Bus. Econ. Stat. 38, 796–809 (2020)
57. Rogers, L.C.G., Veraart, L.A.M.: Failure and rescue in an interbank network. Manag. Sci. 59, 882–898
(2013)
Elicitability and identifiability of set-valued measures of systemic risk 165
58. Steinwart, I., Pasin, C., Williamson, R., Zhang, S.: Elicitation and identification of properties. In:
Balcan, M.F., et al. (eds.) Proceedings of the 27th Conference on Learning Theory. Proceedings of
Machine Learning Research, vol. 35, pp. 482–526 (2014)
59. Strähl, Ch., Ziegel, J.F.: Cross-calibration of probabilistic forecasts. Electron. J. Stat. 11, 608–639
(2017)
60. Svindland, G.: Continuity properties of law-invariant (quasi-)convex risk functions on L∞. Math.
Financ. Econ. 3, 39–43 (2010)
61. Tsyplakov, A.: Theoretical guidelines for a partially informed forecast examiner (2014). Working
paper, available online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67333/1/MPRA_paper_67333.pdf
62. Weber, S.: Distribution-invariant risk measures, information and dynamic consistency. Math. Finance
16, 419–441 (2006)
63. Ziegel, J.F.: Coherence and elicitability. Math. Finance 26, 901–918 (2016)
64. Ziegel, J.F.: Contribution to the discussion of “Of quantiles and expectiles: Consistent scoring func-
tions, Choquet representations and forecast rankings” by Ehm, W., Gneiting, T., Jordan, A. and
Krüger, F. J. R. Stat. Soc., Ser. B, Stat. Methodol. 78, 555–556 (2016)
65. Ziegel, J.F., Krüger, F., Jordan, A., Fasciati, F.: Robust forecast evaluation of expected shortfall. J.
Financ. Econom. 18, 95–120 (2020)
